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Morocco and Algeria face a series of urgent problems that can only be 
properly addressed through higher levels of economic integration and political 
coordination.  Greater integration will achieve two main goals. First, it will help 
both economies by boosting trade between the two countries and by preventing 
“political” barriers from undermining economic exchange. Second, higher levels 
of political coordination will allow both countries to align their geopolitical 
interests in the region and avoid antagonistic objectives.  The success of such a 
project depends on the political will of the leadership to go beyond their past 
disagreements, on support from civil society in both countries and the type of 
institutional framework that is to be adopted. Most important, the success and 
level of integration will depend on the countries’ ability to pragmatically address 
the most pressing problems each country faces and to do so in a way that is 
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Free trade is at the heart of much of the dialogue between the north 
and south, involving issues related to development, fairness, and 
human rights. While free trade offers many benefits, such as job 
creation, economic growth, and increased competition, there are 
still those who feel that opening markets too quickly is not the best 
approach. In particular, they are concerned that rapid opening of an 
economy can create uncertainty and disruption, affecting 
employment and business practices. As advances in technology 
and transportation make international economic transactions fast 
and reliable, nations face pressure to keep pace with international 
changes in trade. While existing inequalities between nations can 
make equal trade relationships difficult, nations cannot isolate 
themselves from the international market. The consensus at the 
present time seems to be towards a single international agreement 
on trade, through the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(The International System, 2001). 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Morocco and Algeria recovered their independence from France, 
respectively, in 1956 and 1962. The periods of colonialism left them poor, 
economically dependent and burdened with unclear and undefined borders. 
From this condition, each country started building its respective economy and 
political system. The dominant factors unifying Morocco and Algeria are religion, 
culture, language, and, of course, the population and geography. 
The Cold War era is over, and most countries already realize they cannot 
cope in an increasingly complex global environment by relying on their internal 
resources alone. For this reason, groups are coming together around the world 
with the purpose of defending themselves economically.  
B. PURPOSE 
Morocco and Algeria also must cooperate with each other; they must face 
the new challenges in their respective countries, as well as that poised from 
outside: Globalization. Morocco and Algeria are the two largest countries and the 
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two most powerful states of the Maghreb. A partnership between Morocco and 
Algeria has the greatest potential as a driving force for dynamic economic and 
political development for the whole region of North Africa. This thesis examines 
how, beyond the crucial Southern Moroccan provinces (Sahara) dispute, these 
two major states of North Africa, similar in so many ways, must seek in their 
recent history the means of a rapprochement. However, it is not only at the level 
of the state, but also at that of civil society and the different political parties that 
such a rapprochement can and must take place.  
C. METHODOLOGY  
The conduct of the qualitative analysis is based on multiple and diverse 
sources: books, academic journals, and scholastic research that concern 
specifically Morocco and Algeria. 
The first chapter of the thesis is a short overview of the situation in 
Morocco and Algeria. The second chapter attempts to show the extent to which 
economic integration can resolve the two countries’ common problems and 
benefit their respective economies, and how this integration can be undertaken. 
We will see that Morocco and Algeria have made significant progress to tighten 
their macroeconomic policies and to open their economies, but more effort is 
needed. There is a considerable advantage when the two countries are more 
open to one another. The integration between the two economies is currently 
weak, but there may be a significant potential trade-off, provided an adaptable 
framework. In addition to the framework, more political coordination between the 
two countries is necessary to avoid disagreements that could sever their 
economic ties. That will be the focus of the third chapter. Greater coordination 
will mainly achieve two objectives. First, it will help economic integration to 
accelerate for both economies’ benefit, and second, it will align both countries’ 
geopolitical interests. We will see how this coordination can be accomplished, 
and the issues that need to be addressed if it is to succeed. Next, we will see the 
extent to which that integration can impact, directly and indirectly, the interests of  
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the great powers in the region, especially the United States and the European 
Union. Finally, the fourth chapter will provide some conclusions reached as well 
as some recommendations. 
D. OVERVIEW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE CHALLENGES  
Given their common origins and identity, the histories of Morocco and 
Algeria were often parallel, politically, economically and socially. 
After the kingdom of Morocco regained its throne and independence, the 
government was represented by the Istiqlal party, a continuity of the political 
structure of the pre-protectorate era. Meanwhile, in Algeria, a violent war of 
independence brought a revolutionary military force to power in contrast to the 
past, leaving little room for political expression (Vermeren, 2004). This transition 
left its mark on the political and social landscape, and the country later 
experienced many violent events, including military coups, civil war, and a 
presidential assassination. 
Economically after independence, the two countries followed different 
orientations. In Morocco, a more liberal stance was adopted, and an active 
agricultural policy helped develop the rural regions and limited the risk of massive 
urbanization. Algeria adopted a centralized economy based mainly on 
hydrocarbons. Attempts were made later to diversify the economy, but that 
proved very difficult. Algeria appears markedly different than Morocco due to the 
virtually unlimited opportunities it derives from its oil wealth and mineral deposits. 
Its economic development plans should promote rapid industrialization, the 
creation of essential infrastructure, and compulsory education. All these 
advantages might have been combined to provide the basis for a modern way of 
life if certain events in 1991, by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the State, 
had not occurred and involved the country in deep turmoil (Zineldin, 1998). 
On the social level, both societies face Islamism and Berber minority 
claims, though expressed more violently in Algeria than in Morocco. The 
unemployment rate in both countries is high, partly because their educational 
systems are not adapted enough to labor market needs, but also because of a 
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lack of dynamism in both economies. Human development indicators in 2001, 
comprised between 0.6 and 0.74 for the Maghreb region against 0.905 for the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE) countries 
(DPEG, 2003, p. 11), show the gap. Morocco needs a growth rate of 6% to 
reduce unemployment and poverty (EIU, 2004a, p. 27) and to absorb the 
300,000 young workers joining the labour market every year (EIU, 2004a, p. 34). 
Algeria needs to create between 260,000 and 300,000 jobs just to keep the 
unemployment rate at the same level (EIU, 2004b, p. 30). This social situation 
helps Islamic fundamentalism to grow and both countries recently were hit with 
violence, though in different ways. The May 2003 Casablanca bombings killed 
forty four people including twelve of the fifteen bombers (EIU, 2004a, p. 7). In 
Algeria, the ban of the FIS and the intervention of the army to stop the electoral 
process in 1991 sparked a civil war that killed 100,000 people (Stora and Ellyas, 
1999). Regional tensions are another source of conflict with the government. For 
example, the Berber-speaking Kabylia region in Algeria witnessed violent claims 
in 2001 that killed eighty people (EIU, 2004b, p. 10). This brief overview gives a 
picture of the social situation in both countries and shows how daunting the tasks 
they face truly are in their efforts to reduce poverty and unemployment and 
provide social peace.  
Article III of the would-be European constitution states that “The union 
aims to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people” (EC, 2005). 
This article could be a foundation for the future of Morocco and Algeria, if their 
relations were warmer. Their borders were closed because of territorial conflicts 
and security concerns, among other reasons.  The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 
created in 1989, offered Morocco and Algeria a chance to settle their long-
standing dispute over the Moroccan Sahara, and to create a regional common 
market in the Maghreb region. After some initial success, the AMU’s inability to 




In this paper, we will argue that the economic integration can help boost 
Morocco and Algeria’s economies and answer their common problems. It is a 
viable option and conceivable solution, creating socio-economic and real 
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II. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the independence of Morocco in 1956, and of Algeria in 1962, both 
countries have followed quite different economic policy paths. Their policies were 
chosen according to ideological convictions and geographical facts. Morocco 
actively developed its agricultural sector with the construction of more than 
seventy dams, mostly designated for irrigation. Despite a diversification of the 
economy, with the services sector representing 45% of the GDP in 2002 and 
25% of the labor force and the manufacturing sector representing 18% of the 
GDP (EIU, 2004a, p. 26), the Moroccan economy still depends significantly on 
tourism and textile exports. The agricultural sector employs 43% of the labour 
force, and it continues to influence the domestic demand (EIU, 2004a, p. 26).  
In contrast, Algeria turned its back to agriculture after independence and 
the Boumedienne regime stressed industries (Stora and Ellyas, 1999). The 
hydrocarbons sector accounts for more than 30% of the GDP and 96% of exports 
(EIU, 2004b, p. 29) making the economy very sensitive to hydrocarbons’ price 
volatility. The agriculture sector accounts for 10-11% of GDP in an average year 
and employs 15% of the labor force (EIU, 2004b, p. 29). 
Another difference between the two economies is the role the private 
sector plays. The privatization program launched in Morocco in 1993 has 
identified 114 state enterprises, around half of which have been sold (EIU, 
2004a, p. 31), generating about US$ 6 billion (MFM, 2004, p. 9).  
The banking sector was reformed and opened to foreign capital, and many 
efforts were made to make the Casablanca Stock Exchange more attractive. Its 
general index rose by 25% in 2003 (EIU, 2004a, p. 46), and its capitalization was 
about US$ 23 billion by the end of 2004 (CSE, 2004). These efforts were 
undertaken in order to inject more private capital into the Moroccan economy.  
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The private sector is less developed in Algeria.  According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), ill-defined land-and-real-estate property 
rights, an inefficient payments system, and lengthy judicial procedures are at the 
heart of the problem (IMF, 2004, p. 5). The Alger stock exchange remains 
undercapitalized, opaque, and generally unattractive (EIU, 2004b, p. 33). In 
1998, a program was set up to privatize eighty-nine state-owned companies, but 
it failed to sell any (EIU, 2004b, p. 30). 
Both countries are trying to become more integrated into the world 
economy. In 1996, Morocco signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the 
European Union, which came into operation in the year 2000. This accord is 
designed to lead progressively to a free-trade zone between Morocco and the EU 
by 2012 (EIU, 2004a, p. 27). Another FTA was signed with the United States in 
2004, which will “serve as a model for further trade accords in the Middle East 
and North Africa” (Shelby, 2004).  Algeria has not managed to emulate this FTA 
with the U.S. for lack of reforms, especially in the banking and the finance 
sectors (EIU, 2004b, p. 17). Algeria signed an association accord in 2001 with 
the EU to improve mainly their economic relations (EIU, 2004b. p. 18). Canada 
wishes to emulate the free trade agreement with Morocco, and Morocco's 
ambassador to Ottawa replied; “Morocco would act as an economic intermediary 
between Canada and African States in a ‘Triangular approach’, Morocco plays a 
similar role with a number of UN organisms” ("Canada should conclude," 2005). 
Decision makers in the two countries implemented economic reforms 
under IMF debt stabilization programs in the mid-1980s. Yet, despite significant 
progress toward market liberalization and stabilization since that time, the results 
are mixed. The growth remains below expectations; its rate between 1970 and 
1999 was 1.5% in Morocco and negative in Algeria (Chabrier, 2001). It is 
estimated that 35% of the workforce in Algeria is either unemployed or 
underemployed (EIU, 2004b, p. 37) and that 18.7% of the urban workforce in 
Morocco is unemployed (EIU, 2004a, p. 34). In addition to the macroeconomic 
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and structural reforms, both countries need to boost their economies further and 
make them more competitive and more integrated into the world economy. 
Morocco and Algeria have different policy options to achieve that 
objective. “They can institute policy reforms and liberalization unilaterally, 
following the examples of Hong Kong, China, and Singapore” (Stern, 2001). They 
can also opt for a bilateral approach, which has the advantage of granting both 
countries access to the other’s market and having reciprocal negotiations so as 
to protect each country’s interests and smooth the transition to a more open 
economy. And, finally, there is the multilateral approach chosen by the Maghreb 
countries in 1989 after the inauguration of the Arab Maghreb Union. The 
drawback of that option is that negotiations tend to be slow and cumbersome 
because of the number of countries involved. 
We believe that one way both countries can achieve their goals and 
become more integrated globally is to create a regional economic zone between 
Morocco and Algeria.  This will not only benefit their respective economies by 
fuelling demand, but will also give both countries the weight they need to 
compete worldwide. This option has a short-term cost, of course. According to 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, when countries initiate their 
reform policies, there are negative economic and social effects in the short run. 
Giacomo Luciano said: “These effects are viewed as the price that must be paid 
in order to strengthen the economy over the longer term” and “the benefits 
accrue in the long run” (Luciano, 1995). 
B. INTEGRATION BENEFITS 
If there is any consensus among economists in the field of international 
trade, it is the proposition that free trade is almost always better than protection 
("Why trade is good for," 1998). The theory of comparative advantage ascribed to 
the nineteenth century British economist David Ricardo argues that “a country 
could gain from trade even when another country has an absolute advantage in 
producing all goods. The former can concentrate on producing those goods and 
services in which it is relatively more efficient” (Dodge, 2003, p. 2). Capital and 
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labor allocations are then optimally allocated and both economies gain in 
productivity and competitiveness. 
A cross-integration of Morocco and Algeria will benefit both countries. 
Both economies are currently undergoing a structural change that should lead 
them progressively to become more integrated in the world economy. Their 
quasi-comparable level will allow them to smooth this transition and give them 
time to adapt progressively within this new economic zone. “Capital and labor re-
allocation will help companies to specialize and will provoke a competition effect” 
(Nabli, 2002, p. 4) that will benefit them and help to build “a sound industrial base 
along with a solid education system, thus gaining the much needed technological 
independence from developed countries” (Zineldin, 1994). 
This “mise à niveau” of both economies is indispensable if they are to 
compete with strong and well intra-integrated regional blocs such as the ASEAN 
and the NAFTA countries or the EU, with its market of more than four hundred 
million consumers and a single currency. An economic zone between Morocco 
and Algeria with a market of more than sixty million consumers will attract much 
more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) than separate markets. There will be a 
“scale effect” (Nabli, 2002, p. 4) that will benefit the whole region and will fuel 
demand.  
Morocco depends heavily on EU investments. For the period 1992 to 
1995, 60.8% of the invested capital came from the EU, mainly from France, with 
a share of 26.2%, because of the historical ties between the two countries. The 
United States accounted for 12.2% only (Lahouel, 2001). If the trade barriers are 
removed, multinational enterprises will be attracted by economies of scale and 
more enticed to locate their production in the region instead of serving its 
markets from the EU as is the case currently. “Economists believe more 
integration will help to offset this “hub and spokes” in the region” (Lahouel, 2001). 
Some international experiences offer evidence of the positive correlation 
between FDI flows and regional integration. The MERCOSUR market is a 
successful case of south-south integration. “Bilateral trade agreements between 
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Brazil and Argentina signed in the 1980s evolved into a customs union that went 
into effect in 1995.  Paraguay and Uruguay joined later. This common market 
received almost fourfold more capital than from the period prior to the customs 
union, rising to more than US$16 billion” (Lahouel, 2001). Stuart Eizenstat, the 
American under-secretary of state for economic, business, and agricultural affairs 
stressed - when he met the finance ministers of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia- 
that “The gradual reduction of intra-regional trade barriers will make the North 
African economies more attractive for foreign investment and more competitive at 
the international level” ("Sous le charme des Yankees," 1999). The General 
Economic Policy Division of the Moroccan Finance Ministry (DPEG) estimates in 
its report that the volume of FDI in the region could reach a regular average of 
US$ 3 billion a year (DPEG, 2003, p. 28), much more than the sum of potential 
FDI each country would receive separately. Table 1 (Martin, 2000, p. 8) shows 
the levels of FDI for the Maghreb countries from 1989 to 1997, with a record level 
of US$ 1.5 billion in 1997. Another exceptional level of FDI was reached in 2001, 
thanks to the privatizations revenues in Morocco that generated US$ 3 billion 
(MFM, 2004, p. 9). We can notice that the FDI is not only low on average in the 
region, but also very volatile from year to year. 
 



















































































Table 1.   Foreign Direct Investment into Maghreb Countries. 1989-1997 
(millions $) (From: World Development Indicators 1999) 
 
A larger economic zone will not only fuel demand but also diversify it.  This 
will make the economy less vulnerable and less dependant on weather 
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conditions, in Morocco, for example, where agriculture influences domestic 
demand, or on oil prices in Algeria where hydrocarbons dominate exports.  
The main trading partner of Morocco and Algeria remains the EU; the 
Union imports 70% and 40% of Morocco and Algeria’s exports, respectively. 
These figures show to what extent these economies are dependent on the 
European activity and how narrow their negotiation latitude is with their main 
partner. By being more open to each other, the two economies will diversify their 
demand and thus be less dependent on a single partner’s economic 
performance. 
The geographical proximity of the two countries means lower 
transportation and communication costs, which gives them a “competitive 
advantage in trading with one another in developing subcontracting networks” 
(Holl, 2004 p. 2). Practical observation showed that countries of particular 
regions seem to experience growth rates that cannot be explained simply by 
individual countries’ domestic policies.  Europe in the 1950s and 1960s was a 
dynamic neighbourhood, mainly driven by Germany’s performance. East Asia 
was also a good neighbourhood, thanks to the economic weight of Japan. This 
effect is described by economists “as the neighborhood effect and the spillovers” 
(Dervis, 1997). One explanation of this effect is connected to human capital and 
labor flows: “when a country builds a successful human capital base, members of 
this capital can migrate to neighbouring countries and have a positive effect on 
productivity (Dervis, 1997).  
International experience provides evidence of the benefits of integration 
for learning acceleration and technological catch-up.  The learning process in 
regional markets can be substantial. Morocco and Algeria can use the potential 
that exists in intra-regional trade to serve as a laboratory for developing global 
export competitiveness. In Latin America, “firm-level data indicate that 64 out of  
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106 firms participating in sampled regional trade agreements successfully made 
the transition from intra-regional to extra-regional exports” (Devlin and Page, 
2001). 
Policy emulation can be of benefit for both countries. Studies have shown 
that “when a country adopts a given set of policies, neighbors follow suit leading 
to a regional effect; and as national policies are well designed and effectively 
executed they are also good for regional neighbourhoods” (Dervis, 1997). 
This chapter attempted to give a global picture of the many benefits of the 
economic integration. Despite this, trade between Morocco and Algeria remains 
very low and below its potential, as we will see in the next chapter. 
C. TRADE BARRIERS 
When we analyze trade figures in the Maghreb region, we are struck by 
the weakness of intra-regional trade in respect to total exports. As shown in 
Table 2 (DPEG, 2003, p. 18), this rate barely reached 0.6% for the period 
between 1996 and 2000, whereas internal trade reached 60.2% of total exports 
of the EU, 22.3% of the ASEAN countries, and 19.9% of those of MERCOSUR 
(DPEG, 2003, p. 2). Figure 1 (DPEG, 2003, p. 18) also illustrates the particular 
weakness of trade also between Morocco and Algeria, as shown. 
 


























Table 2.   Maghreb Countries Exports Destination (From: DPEG) 
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Figure 1.   Magreb Intra-Regional Trade Geography in Percent (From: DPEG) 
 
There is, paradoxically, more trade between Morocco and Tunisia, 
although their economies seem more similar than between Morocco and Algeria, 
with a lower degree of similarity. According to the DPEG, the calculation of this 
similarity (using the Finger-Kreinen index, which calculates the degree of 
similarity between exportations of two countries to the same trading partner),  
based on the exports to the EU, shows a level of 4.7% between Morocco and 
Algeria and 78.9% between Morocco and Tunisia as Table 3 (DPEG, 2003. p. 
21) shows. 
 90 – 95 96 – 00 
Morocco - Algeria 2.50 % 4.70 % 
Morocco - Tunisia 75 % 78.90 % 
Algeria - Tunisia 13.70 % 13.30 % 
 
Table 3.   Maghreb Countries Exports Similarity (From: DPEG) 
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Economic models, such as the gravity models that link trade volume to the 
economic size and distance between partners, suggest that bilateral trade 
between Algeria and its neighbors is below potential (Chabrier, 2001). 
The reasons for this weakness are many; besides the regional tensions 
and political disagreements between Morocco and Algeria that we will address 
later in this paper, there are many other non-tariff barriers. Transportation issues 
dampen intra-regional  trade by increasing costs, the number of maritime lines is 
limited between Morocco and Algeria, the terrestrial border has been closed 
since the 1994 events in Marrakech, and capacity for air freight is limited (Nabli, 
2002. p. 2). Finally, there are impediments in the payment system, as delays and 
inefficiencies seem frequent in the financial sector area (Nabli, 2002,  p. 2). 
These barriers prevent both economies from benefiting from their 
structural complementarities, but, as we will see in the next section, prospects of 
trade between Morocco and Algeria are promising. 
D. TRADE OPPORTUNITIES 
DPEG estimates trade potential in the Maghreb region to US$ 1.6 billion, if 
all the barriers were removed. Morocco’s exports in the region will jump from 
1.6% currently to 6% of its total exports, and Algeria would reach a comparable 
level. As shown in Table 4 (Escribano and Jordan, 1998, p. 17), the revealed 
comparative advantage of Mediterranean countries shows the highest rate in 
mineral fuels for Algeria while Morocco remains more competitive in fruit and 
















Algeria 0.0 0.0 9.9 0.1 0.3 
Morocco 0.8 8.4 0.2 2.4 8.1 
Tunisia 1.0 11.5 1.4 1.0 1.1 
Jordan 0.7 0.6 0.0 1.6 5.4 
Egypt 0.4 1.6 6.4 0.8 2.6 
Lebanon 0.9 3.2 0.1 2.0 9.3 
Syria 0.1 1.0 8.4 1.6 2.2 
Israel 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.6 2.3 
Cyprus 0.8 5.0 0.3 2.7 13.7 
Turkey 1.0 7.2 0.2 2.0 6.6 
 
Table 4.   Revealed Comparative Advantage of Mediterranean Countries in 
International Trade 1992 – 1994 (From: Escribano and Jordan, 1998) 
 
In the energy sector, for example, Morocco plans to increase consumption 
of natural gas to 5 billion cu metres/year in 2020, while local production is a mere 
50 m cu metres/year (EIU, 2004a, p. 26). The country has access to 1 billion cu 
metres/year of Algerian natural gas, in lieu of transit fees of the Euro-Maghreb 
gas pipeline that crosses Morocco on its way from Algeria to Spain. Morocco 
could increase its import of gas from the Euro-Maghreb pipeline, but it is unlikely 
to want to become dependent upon this source because of the nature of its 
political relationship with neighboring Algeria (EIU, 2004a, p. 26). As shown in 
Table 5 (MCE, 2005), energy imports from Algeria represented 7% of Morocco’s 
total energy imports in 2003 and a mere 0.5% of Algeria’s energy exports in the 







 All Algeria % 
Food, drinks and tobacco 11,430,387,223 6,879,235 0.0602 
% 
Energy 21,160,546,434 1,510,772,274 7.1396 
% 
Raw materials of vegetal and 
animal origin 
7,324,691,576 3,861,400 0.0527 
% 
Raw materials of mineral origin 2,473,665,319 - 0.0000 
% 
Semi-finished 30,637,410,257 131,544,533 0.4294 
% 
Agricultural equipment 1,003,985,067 - 0.0000 
% 
Industrial equipment 28,968,970,839 31,238 0.0001 
% 
Consumer goods 32,204,474,697 2,634,093 0.0082 
% 
 
Table 5.   Morocco’s 2003 Imports (in MDH) (From: MCE) 
 
Morocco’s food exports to Algeria account for 0.6% of Moroccan total food 
exports and a mere 0.3% of Algerian food imports. Forty percent of Algerian 
imports come from France and Spain (DPEG, 2003, p. 17).  
As shown in Table 6 (MCE, 2005), Morocco’s exports of citrus and fish to 
Algeria are low, although Morocco has an absolute advantage in this sector and 
remains more competitive in comparison to its European neighbors, thanks to its 
developed citrus agriculture and  rich fishing grounds off the Atlantic coast. The 
food sector illustrates the necessity for the Moroccan economy to diversify its 
trading partners to have more weight in bilateral negotiations. Citrus and 
tomatoes, which Morocco produces more cheaply than the EU (EIU, 2004a, p. 
49) do not have full access to the European market and are subject to quotas 
imposed to protect members of the Union from the Moroccan competition. 
“The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains the main obstacle 
towards wider access by southern Mediterranean countries to European 
agricultural markets, where they are competitive” (Escribano, 2000). 
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 All Algeria % 
Citrus 2,183,963,117 177,600 0.0081% 
 
Fish 1,597,567,869 2,383,385 0.1492 % 
 
Processed food 1,304,576,777 20,288,219 1.5552 % 
 
Canned fish 3,224,989,396 1,954,249 0.0606 % 
 
Clothing 18,548,048,608 32,645,862 0.1760 % 
 
 
Table 6.   Morocco’s 2003 Exports (in MDH) (From: MCE) 
 
In the fishing sector, Morocco did not renew its accord with the EU that 
allowed European trawlers to fish in Moroccan waters until 1999.  Morocco wants 
to impose biological rest periods and stop over-fishing. Since the departure of the 
European fleet, fish exports have risen, encouraging the development of the 
fishing industry (EIU, 2004a, p. 38). 
Algeria imports from Morocco only 0.9% of its total textile imports (DPEG, 
2003). Moroccan exports of clothes to Algeria account for a mere 0.17% as 
shown in Table 6 (MCE, 2005). Morocco can consolidate its presence in the 
Algerian market, especially since the drop in its exports to the EU with the full 
liberalization of the sector in January 2005. 
Labor mobility has served traditionally as the primary form of integration 
among Arab economies, and Nemat Shafik (1992) showed that the pattern of 
regional integration in the Middle East was unique and quite different from other 
examples, such as  the European Union, East Asia, and North America, where 
trade in goods acted as the primary engine for integration, and labor movement 
was the final and the most controversial feature. “The migration between the 
countries of the region is facilitated by the similarity of culture and language” 
(Pissarides, 1993). Morocco and Algeria are linked not only by geographic 
proximity and history, common moral and religious standards, and generally  
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uniform modes of life, but, as well, by tradition and trading practices. “These 
cohesive forces help them to make good partnerships in their social and 
technological structures” (Zineldin, 1998) 
In the tourism sector, thousands of Algerian tourists used to visit Morocco, 
until 1994, when an entry visa was imposed by Morocco after Algeria was 
alleged to be linked to Islamists who shot two Western tourists in a Marrakech 
hotel. Since the cancellation of the visa requirement by Morocco in July 2004, the 
prospect of increased Algerian tourism has risen. Prior to July 2004, most 
Algerian tourists, 800,000 tourists in 2002 ("Destination Tunisie," 2003), spent 
their holidays in neighboring Tunisia.  
Capital can also flow across borders. Moroccan and Algerian 
businessmen can establish joint ventures wherever they can bring their local 
market knowledge and know-how. Once used to the neighboring market, they 
can invest solely in their own projects. The Casablanca Chamber of Commerce 
recently organised a joint economic forum, in which Algerian and Moroccan 
entrepreneurs worked together to establish business contacts ("Algérie-Maroc," 
2005). 
Algerian investors can also invest in the Moroccan exchange; the 
Casablanca stock exchange remains very attractive with a 25% performance in 
2003. Cooperation can be developed further by merging stock exchanges, for 
example (Chabrier, 2001), as did the European exchanges of Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Paris to create the leading European Exchange: Euronext. 
Morocco has also offered fiscal incentives to encourage investment in the 
tourism sector under the so-called “Plan Azur” (EIU, 2004a, p. 46) and is strongly 
promoting tourism investment. In May 2005, the United Arab Emirates drafted an 
accord to launch a two-billion-dollar project in the city of Rabat, which 
demonstrates the confidence of foreign investors in the Moroccan economy 
("Morocco - UAE launch 2bn$," 2005). 
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We have seen so far that trade opportunities do exist and can be 
exploited, provided there is an adaptable framework. The next section explains 
the fundamentals that both countries should address to build such a framework. 
E. INTEGRATION BUILDING 
The success of integration will definitely depend on the pillars on which it 
is built. We believe this process should be built on three fundamentals.  First, the 
legal and institutional framework within which the economic relations will take 
place should be pragmatic and adaptable. Second, both economies need to be 
healthy to benefit fully from the integration, and thus, both countries should step 
up the pace of their reforms. And third, joint investments are needed to build 
common infrastructures to strengthen their links and facilitate cross-borders 
movements. The goal of these measures is to facilitate and help to correct 
current distortions against intra-regional trade. Economic agents will naturally 
come to work then to establish more links toward true integration. 
The institutional framework should focus on “helping remove tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, while limiting bureaucratic activism” (Shafik, 1994), without 
imposing too many restrictions on the economies. The European Union has been 
less successful each time there have been interventionist policies, such as the 
“Common Agriculture Policy”, and technology and industrial policies. 
“The regional integration can take different forms: 
• It can be simply a free-trade area where both countries can grant 
preferential access to each other’s market.  
• A customs’ union goes one step further and harmonizes custom 
duties for both countries vis-à-vis third countries.  
• A common market is a customs union that allows free movement of 
factors of production.  
• And, finally, an economic union extends the integration process by 
including policy harmonization, particularly macroeconomic and 
regulatory policies” (Dessus, Devlin, and Safadi, 2001). 
The Algerian proposal of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) committees in 
1989 was to build the Arab Maghrib Market in four steps. First, a free-trade zone 
by 1992, then a customs union by 1995, then a common market by 2000, and 
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finally an economic union (Ben El Hassan Alaoui, 1994, p. 164). Unfortunately, 
the proposal was too ambitious to be realizable.  
The first step of this proposal is the most adaptable for these two 
countries’ context (Escribano and Jordan, 1998, p. 15). Free trade agreements 
should be signed between the two countries on a pre-established list of products, 
moving gradually toward a free trade-zone agreement. The average customs 
duty in the region for the period from 1997 to 1999 was between 22.1% and 
29.9% (DPEG, 2003, p. 23), too high a level for developing countries. In parallel 
to these agreements, joint commissions should be established to work on the 
harmonization of policies and adoption of common licensing standards in the 
labor market. A similar commission was established in 1990 within the AMU to 
work on all food security related matters (DPEG, 2003, p. 12). This general 
framework will be closer to the NAFTA model than to a full economic union like 
the EU However, the process should be less difficult to implement in the region in 
comparison to North America, considering the respective market sizes. “The 
harmonization effort in the NAFTA area proves difficult within the sole provinces 
of Canada” (Dodge, 2003, p. 7), and “the Americans have different concerns with 
respect to the Mexican border” (Dodge, 2003, p. 6) than do Morocco and Algeria 
with respect to each other. The quasi-comparable level of their economies raises 
less concern to opening borders. 
The question of whether or not to go beyond this framework toward a full 
single market or a monetary union is premature. The two countries need first to 
construct an economic zone where goods, services, capital, and labour can 
move freely. In the case of Europe, a single currency was a means to accelerate 
integration. Many European leaders believe that the euro is not only a symbol for 
unity but also a potential instrument to drive political integration. Joschka Fisher, 
once Germany’s foreign minister argued in a speech in 2001 that the euro is “a 
profoundly political act” ("Europe's Big Idea," 2002). 
The second condition for integration to succeed is the extensive reforms 
that must be undertaken by the two countries: “regional cooperation cannot be a 
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substitute for macroeconomic and structural reforms”(Chabrier, 2001).The central 
conclusion that emerged from a World Bank study that looked at regional trade 
initiatives and their successes and failures is that “most successful regional trade 
agreements involve either rich countries merged with other rich countries or rich 
countries merged with poor or intermediate countries” (Nabli, 2002, p. 5).  
“Foreign Direct Investment flows are stimulated by macroeconomic 
stability and predictability, the quality of the infrastructure, the skills and the 
efficiency of bureaucracy, and the administrative procedures” (Lahouel, 2001). 
Morocco and Algeria have tightened their macroeconomic policies and 
deregulated their markets, but further efforts are still needed. “Both countries can 
rely on their agreements with the EU, because those agreements provide them 
with a common framework for reform” (Chabrier, 2001). The IMF regrets that the 
state-owned commercial banks in Algeria play a quasi-fiscal role by propping up 
failing state-owned companies (EIU, 2004b, p. 32). The financial sector needs 
more reforms; “a more efficient sector with low lending margins would stimulate 
investment by reducing the cost of funds” (Dessus, Devlin, and Safadi, 2001. p. 
41). The Credit remains expensive in Algeria and beyond the reach of most 
private firms and individuals, and the payment system is inefficient and unreliable 
(EIU, 2004b, p. 48).  
In Morocco, only 20% of the financing comes from the banking sector. 
Moroccan manufacturing firms are financed overwhelmingly from their owners’ 
equity and retained earnings (EIU, 2004a, p. 44). The privatization rhythm should 
step up in Algeria.  In 2002, the government announced that it would privatize 
one hundred state-owned firms. Yet by September 2004, nothing had been sold 
(EIU, 2004b, p. 31). The labor market needs to be regulated and harmonized to 
enable the work force to move freely. Morocco has adopted a new labor code 
designed to encourage investment and job creation and protect workers’ rights. 
The code formalizes the right to trade union representation and allows short-term 
contracts under certain conditions (EIU, 2004a, p. 29). The standards of 
corporate governance also should be raised in both countries, to create a 
 23
business friendly environment. Agreements on professional and technical 
services can promote investment and technology transfer. “The increasing 
pressure from both skill-intensive and capital-intensive East Asian economies 
and the increasing competition from the Central Eastern European countries 
which have a geographic proximity advantage can be countered by developing 
increasingly sophisticated service exports” (Devlin and Page, 2001).  
Morocco is making considerable “efforts to reduce the public-sector 
burden and improve its efficiency”. A program has recently been set (2005) to 
offer about 30,000 civil servants a package for voluntary leave, “this program will 
help save about 12.5% of the GDP” ("Depart volontaire des," 2005). The public 
administration accounted for 17% of the GDP in Morocco (EIU, 2004b, p. 57) 
even though it was never as large as Tunisia's or Egypt's. Also, Morocco is set to 
boost “E-government”, which is now to develop information online. However, the 
government wants it to be more than this and to offer services online. Around 
$166 million was allocated to provide over two hundred services online in relation 
to the public sector ("Morocco set to boost," 2005). Algeria can take an example 
from the Moroccan experience to reduce its administration budget and improve 
its efficiency. 
Finally, the third pillar to help integration is the development of 
infrastructures and communications between Morocco and Algeria. High freight 
rates affect trade. Transportation laws have traditionally affected the flow of 
goods and capital. Surveys estimated that costs incurred by restrictive transport 
practices in the Maghrib “amount to US$ 30 million for Morocco, US$ 94 million 
for Algeria, and US$ 71 million for Tunisia” (Devlin and Page, 2001). 
Telecommunications should be developed further. The limited number of 
maritime and terrestrial links results in further costs to trade and affects 
competitiveness. “Better infrastructures can facilitate business activities and 





F. GAME THEORY 
In addition to these three pillars, game theory also supports cooperation 
as the best strategy. The Appendix contains a detailed argument on Nash 
Arbitration Theory. In brief, it shows that the optimal solution, in the face of the 
internal socio-economic challenges and the new world economic order, is 
economic Integration between the two countries, and free trade agreements with 
others blocs. The two countries cannot benefit by unilaterally departing from their 
associate strategy. The theory gives many solutions on “the Pareto Optimal line” 
illustrating the negotiation set, where negotiated solutions may occur, but there is 
only one outcome which gives both countries and / or challengers better payoffs, 
or would give one of them a better payoff. From this point, either the 
governments of Morocco and Algeria, and/or the challengers can do better. It is 
the Nash Arbitration Point: NAP  
History provides examples of successful unions: the United States, the 
largest federation, and the European Union, in the process of finalizing a 
common constitution.  Morocco and Algeria have all the ingredients for a 
successful integration: the same religion, the same language, and the same 
cultural diversity.  
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III. POLITICAL COORDINATION 
A.  COORDINATION OBJECTIVES 
In this chapter, we will discuss the extent to which political coordination 
can be a means to go beyond the problems of Morocco and Algeria. In Europe, 
the period of political dominance came to an end with the Second World War. In 
1945, Germany was defeated, France humiliated, Britain bankrupt; and countries 
of central and eastern Europe had been absorbed by the Soviet empire 
(Rachman, 2004). The founding fathers of what is now the European Union - 
Jean Monnet, a French civil servant, and Robert Shuman, a French foreign 
minister- were convinced that the origins of conflict lay in the continental system 
of competing nation-states (Rachman, 2004).  
Arab countries did try and made some efforts towards cooperation and 
integration, but little progress was made. “The Arab League was the first to call 
for agreements for economic cooperation among Arab counties” (Zineldin, 1998). 
The politicians did not pay enough attention to economic integration. Business 
and commerce were things that politicians looked down on, and thus  it has 
never been on their agenda. Today, the importance of the national economies’ 
role in realizing political goals is essential and obvious: “with the emergence of 
various international blocs, the issue no longer needs to be argued” (Zineldin, 
1998).  
For these reasons, the objectives of Moroccan-Algerian coordination 
should be clearly defined. First, coordination will give the necessary impetus to 
economic integration between the two countries. Second, it will gradually align 
the geopolitical interests of both countries in the region. But, economic 
integration between Morocco and Algeria faces many obstacles because of the 
nature of the political relations between the two countries. The terrestrial border 
is still closed, and the cross-border climate is not business friendly. Creating an 
economic zone between Morocco and Algeria requires an institutional framework 
in which trade, labour, and capital movement all are regulated. To repeat, 
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political coordination would give the necessary impetus to economic 
development rather than hindering it. At the same time, economic integration 
creates a natural movement toward deep political integration. “In a single market, 
governments tend to favor uniformity, coherence, and coordination to avoid a 
patchwork of different policies” ("Our constitution for," 2000). 
The second objective of more political coordination is the alignment of 
geopolitical interests. The Sahara is an area of disagreement between Morocco 
and Algeria. In 1975, King Hassan II organised the “Green March”, a peaceful 
march of 350,000 Moroccans, to recover the Southern provinces (Sahara). 
The Polisario, a separatist group claiming this territory, moved to Algeria 
and started a long guerrilla war against Morocco. This conflict gave Algeria an 
opportunity to weaken its rival Morocco and to hope for a potential access to the 
Atlantic (Hormat Allah, 2004, p. 103). A cease-fire was declared in 1991 under 
the auspices of the UN, but an acceptable agreement between the parties has 
proved elusive. One proposed referendum was rejected because of 
disagreements about who should be allowed to vote. Then the Polisario and 
Algeria rejected a solution granting general autonomy under Moroccan 
sovereignty. Finally, a solution allowing wide-spread autonomy, followed by a 
referendum, was rejected by Morocco, which considers its sovereignty non 
negotiable. The aim of this thesis is not to defend or demonstrate the legitimacy 
of Morocco’s territories, which is historically self-evident. “In the eleventh century, 
under the Almoravides dynasty, a tribe originally coming from the Sahara, 
Moroccan territories stretched as far as the borders of Senegal (Hasbi and 
Serghini, 1998. p. 95). Nor is it our intention to demonstrate the legitimacy of the 
international accords, in particular, the Madrid tripartite accords in 1975 between 
Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania (Hasbi and Serghini, 1998. p. 95). We do argue, 
however, that whatever solution is adopted, it should respect Moroccan 
sovereignty. 
Hormat Allah has presented an interesting option to resolving this conflict 
between Morocco and Algeria. He suggested the creation of a common 
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economic zone in this rich hydrocarbon and mineral region that would benefit 
both countries (Hormat Allah, 2004, p. 195). For Morocco, this option would end 
a long-lasting conflict with its neighbor and will allow the organization of a 
referendum by which all voters would be allowed to vote (Hormat Allah, 2004, p. 
198). This would also end the inhuman detention conditions of the 408 Moroccan 
prisoners of war still held by the Polisario Front in the Algerian territory of 
Tindouf.  Many have been incarcerated for over two decades and are the longest 
serving prisoners of war in the world, despite a U.N Security Council resolution 
“urging the Polisario Front to release without delays all remaining prisoners of 
war in compliance with international humanitarian law" ("Will somebody notices," 
2005). The Washington Times recently called for "applying the same treatment 
reserved to terrorist organizations to the Polisario Front. As long as it continues 
to hold human beings in bondage, it must be regarded as an enemy of 
civilization" ("Will Somebody Notice," 2005). For Algeria, the solution to this 
problem will provide an opportunity to normalize its relations and develop 
economic cooperation with Morocco. Algeria can use the Moroccan territories to 
access the Atlantic and export its natural resources (Hormat Allah, 2004, p. 205). 
This newly opened corridor would boost the economy of the whole south-
Algerian region. 
This option seems a singular viable solution: it serves not only the mutual 
interests of Morocco and Algeria but also the United States, which has a 
particular interest in the region. A developed transatlantic economic zone would 
become more accessible and exploitable. However, the success of this solution 
requires a shift in the way both countries perceive the conflict. Algeria has always 
considered Morocco, and particularly the Sahara conflict, as in internal political 
“enjeu”. Instead, it would see Morocco as a committed partner for economic 
development in the region. Algeria should begin to consolidate its relations with 
Morocco and maintain a consistent attitude toward the Sahara issue. The recent 
declarations by Algerian President Bouteflika, including his message of support 
on the anniversary of the Polisario creation, coincided with the maneuvers 
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conducted by Polisario behind the security wall ("Polisario threatens," 2005) and 
exacerbated relations with Morocco. Some observers believe there is a link 
between the events that recently disrupted the public order in the southern city of 
Laayoune and the new crisis in the Algerian-Moroccan relations following 
President Bouteflika’s declarations ("Polisario threatens," 2005). Moreover, the 
Algerian populace does not consider the Sahara conflict as either an internal or a 
national matter, but rather as a circumscribed military issue (Stora, 2002. p. 141). 
Houcine Ait Ahmed, leader of Algerian Socialist Forces Front (SFF), said: “If 
Morocco and Algeria manage to create an economic zone at their borders and If 
Algeria and Tunisia succeed in doing the same, the borders issue will become 
quite futile.” He added, “Our two peoples (Moroccan and Algerian) are not 
doomed to receive hostile discourses and accusations that false nationalism 
stands for historical reality”, a clear allusion to divergences between Morocco 
and Algeria over this latter’s support for the Polisario separatists ("Creation of 
Algeria-Morocco," 2005). 
Separatism is not a viable option to settling this conflict. The international 
support for the Polisario Front is weak.  The number of countries recognizing the 
front is seriously dropping, according to the Jeune Afrique l’Intelligent weekly 
("Serious Drop in Number," 2005). It has fallen from 76 in 1995 to 49 at present. 
Even the African countries recognizing the separatist group has dropped from 34 
to 22 ("Serious Drop in Number," 2005). The Moroccan minister of foreign affairs 
and cooperation, Mohammed Benaissa, pointed out in 2003 that creating small 
entities in the Sahara "would be adventurous and a dangerous precedent", 
because “if separatism demons are unleashed, no country would be spared until 
the Red Sea” ("Creating Small Entities," 2003). The French doctor of geopolitics, 
Aymeric Chauperade, noted also in 2003 that “drawing a parallel between the 
Sahara and East Timor issues is not a scientific approach”. For the Sahara there 
has been a time-old harmony between northern and southern Morocco ("Sahara 
is not East Timor," 2003). 
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Morocco and Algeria should also seek to promote  social integration in the 
Sahara region through the organization of cultural events. The desert Music 
Festival organized recently in Morocco, which gathered bands from Algeria, 
Niger, Mali, and Senegal ("Prince Moulay Rachid," 2005), is a good example of 
such  promotion. Morocco has an ambitious program to develop the country’s 
southern provinces, with a global investment of US$ 800 million for the period 
2004-2008 ("Morocco Announces Program," 2004). Projects to be carried out in 
southern provinces will cover several sectors, including housing and urban 
development (US $188 million), fisheries (US $177 million), water and 
environment (US $256 million),and roads, ports, and infrastructures (US $173 
million). 
Having discussed in this section the objectives of Moroccan-Algerian 
coordination, in the next part we will explore some means to reach those goals 
and the fundamentals coordination should respect. 
B.  ESTABLISHING COORDINATION 
The success of Moroccan-Algerian coordination will depend on the pillars 
on which that integration is built. There are three main requirements:  the 
commitment of the leadership, the cooperation of civil societies, and the 
adaptation of the institutional framework to both countries’ situations and their 
relationship. If integration takes place in an adaptable environment and is given 
necessary impetus by the leadership, then the economic and social dynamic can 
evolve in a virtual circle and all three pillars will be mutually strengthened. 
Let us look closer at the first pillar. There have been historical rivalries for 
regional leadership between the two countries. Algeria decided in the wake of its 
independence to play an emblematic role as the third-world movement’s leader, 
a role that had been assumed by Egypt under Gamal Abd-Nasser. The late 
President Houari Boumedienneof Algeria declared once that “his country will be 
concerned by whatever happens in Africa from Cairo to the Cap” (Hormat Allah, 
2004, p. 28). The oil crisis and rising prices of hydrocarbons gave him the means 
to pursue his vision. With the help of the Soviet Union, Algeria equipped itself 
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with a military arsenal to parallel its diplomacy. But, since the fall of the Soviet 
bloc and the slump in oil prices, Algeria can no longer afford its third-world-leader 
role. Social unrest and internal crises force its leaders to focus more on domestic 
policy, though Algerian leaders are still tempted to exploit the Sahara issue. 
The Algerian president’s  recent declaration of and his support message to 
the Polisario Front some days before the scheduled Tripoli meeting of the Arab 
Maghreb Union(AMU) leaders after an interruption of eleven years, forced 
Morocco to pull out, and the meeting was cancelled ("Le Maroc déplore les," 
2005). The AMU has failed to hold a summit since 1994, notably because of 
tensions between Morocco and Algeria over the Sahara issue ("Bouteflika 
statements," 2005). This failure illustrates the nature of the Algerian-Moroccan 
relations. Morocco deplores the contradictory approach of the Algerian 
diplomacy, especially as their relations had remarkably improved after the visit of 
King Mohammed VI during the last Arab League meeting in Alger in March 2005. 
The Algerian foreign affairs minister even talked of the warming of the bilateral 
relations ("Un sommet de l'UMA avant," 2005). Algeria needs to have a 
consistent diplomatic approach to Morocco if they are to build a strong 
relationship. Contradictory declarations will only undermine the long-term 
association of two the leaders and societies. 
A second condition for the success of this mutual integration is the 
involvement of the civil societies and their commitment to constructing a true 
Maghreban society. Identity concerns are still fervent in these young countries, 
especially in Algeria, where colonization lasted longer and the war for 
independence was much more violent. But both peoples should go beyond their 
differences and be convinced that it is in their mutual interest to have more 
integrated societies. We can see the extent to which popular support is crucial in 
the recent EU vote for adoption of the new constitution. The outcome of the 
referendum held in France in May 2005 showed more support for the “No” camp 
among the French electorate. This support is motivated by many factors, 
including nationalist reflexes among some electors and growing fears of a loosely 
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enlarged Europe to the East among others. Some analysts believe that ”No” 
means, the end of the EU, because it will lead to a deadlock of the constitutional 
building process and will shake the confidence Europeans have had so far in 
their community. 
There is an analogy between that situation and the Maghreb, to a certain 
extent, although Morocco and Algeria do not have the social, cultural, and 
linguistic distinctions that divide the European countries. For example, the quasi-
comparable level of Morocco and Algeria’s economies and societies raises little 
concern about the preservation of their social model or immigration issues. 
In Europe, rich countries such as “Germany and France have developed 
an elaborate welfare state that is becoming increasingly unaffordable as their 
populations age. With the creation of a single market and a single currency, 
these national characteristics can cause tensions throughout the union” 
(Rachman, 2004).  
In Morocco and Algeria, However, both nations should recognize that 
there is a historical gap between the generations of the 1950s, who fought 
colonization together, and the current generations (Stora, 2002, p. 126).  This 
gap must be bridged. The colonization of Algeria lasted more than a century and 
a half and, in Morocco about fifty years. During that period, the borders 
delimitated the two countries and limited the movement of people and goods. 
Historically, there were no tensions between Morocco and Algeria.  There was 
solidarity between the two societies on numerous occasions. The Algerians 
supported Moroccans of the Rif during the insurrections of 1920 (Stora, 2005); a 
common liberation committee of the Maghreb was established in Cairo in 1948, 
and fundamental links were established between leaders of the nationalist parties 
(Stora, 2005). After independence, as the euphoria of building a great Maghrib 
gradually weakened, national pride in each society rose (Stora, 2005). To allow 
the societies to intermix, free movement of people will of course be crucial. This  
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raises some security concerns to be addressed later in this paper, but both 
countries have taken positives steps, such as Morocco’s suppression of an entry 
visa for Algerian nationals in July 2004. 
The process of building the Maghreb also includes the transversal 
question of culture. Writers, painters, film makers, and academics from both 
societies are helping to create a common vision and are a factor of 
rapprochement.   “Culture is usually decisive and can anticipate politics” (Stora, 
2005). The building of a true civil society requires meetings between intellectuals, 
cultural exchanges, tourism development, and students exchange programs. The 
role of the media is also crucial; Moroccan and Algerian satellite channels are 
received across the borders.  Algerian music stars are applauded in Morocco, 
and both publics carefully follow sporting events. More economic integration also 
will intensify the movement of service labor, thereby strengthening the links 
between the communities. 
The third pillar of this integration is the institutional framework. The term 
“political integration” as used here can only be loosely defined. Political 
integration can range from simply the coordination of policies between countries 
to the establishment of a federal state or a federation of state-nations.  The 
model for and the form of this integration are crucial and should be adapted to 
the situations in both countries. An overly ambitious project may result in 
inefficiency. The initial framework should give the countries the ability to achieve 
their common goals, thereby allowing the framework to gradually evolve as their 
social and economic relations strengthen and the respective interests of both 
countries are aligned. This model should not in anyway reduce the sovereignty of 
member states over their own matters. A framework based more on cooperation 
between member states rather than on supra-national institutions will be more 
adaptable to the situations of both countries. “Attempts at cooperation, alliances, 
and integration among Arab and Islamic countries in the last four decades were 
too ambitious. We find big projects at the beginning and very little or nothing was 
left at the end” (Zineldin, 1998). The experience of the AMU gives us some idea 
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of how difficult it is to find broad consensus within large unions. Size matters, 
especially at their inception, and there is trade-off between enlargement and 
deepening of the union. In the case of the EU, many of the most ardent believers 
in the creation of the European federation see enlargement as an unwelcome 
distraction; “widening and deepening are often seen as opposing courses” 
(Rachman, 2004). 
The institutional and technical organs of the AMU that were instituted in 
the February 1989 Marrakech meeting, and are largely inspired by the European 
model, are well suited for a coordination framework between Morocco and 
Algeria. “The presidential council is at the core of this organization, alone able to 
make decisions; a joint commission is in charge of all technical issues with 
specialised sub-commissions in each domain; a ministerial council is in charge of 
preparing for the head-of-states meetings and also serves as an interface 
between the commission recommendations and the presidential council 
decisions” (Ben El Hassan Alaoui, 1994, p. 126). The commission can work on 
three fundamental axes: economy and infrastructures, security, and social affairs 
and human resources. 
In regard to the economic axis, the above framework describes how 
economic cooperation can allow both countries to strengthen their economic 
integration. A specialised sub-commission can work on all financial, economic 
and infrastructures matters:  coordinating regulations, improving the economic 
environment by removing trade barriers, and developing cross-border 
infrastructures. 
In parallel to an economic zone, Morocco and Algeria should begin to 
build a security zone, as Europe did by building the EU  The idea of armed 
conflict between its member countries is unthinkable nowadays. Karl Deutsh has 
labelled this conceptual formation as “the security community” ("Strategic 
Security," 2004). Each country commits itself to ban any activity in its territories 
that could harm the stability or the security of its neighbor.  The foundation texts 
of the AMU stress this point (Ben El Hassan Alaoui, 1994, p. 162). A security 
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sub-commission can coordinate the efforts of both countries to achieve this goal. 
“Morocco and Algeria agreed to set up a cooperation task group to consider 
illegal immigration, terrorism, and all other issues that might threaten security, 
peace and stability in the two sister countries" says the joint communiqué 
following a meeting between King Mohammed VI and President Abdul Aziz 
Bouteflika, ("Morocco, Algeria Set," 2003). 
Finally, the third axis of concern is the social affairs. The opening of 
borders can enable economic and social relations to evolve naturally. Matters 
relative to the free movement of people, and the right of residency and individual 
liberties should be treated jointly. The Schengen zone within the EU is a good 
example of how member states’ nationals can circulate freely within such a zone. 
These issues can be treated by a specialized sub-commission that also takes in 
charge the student exchange programs and joint cultural and sporting events. 
Any integration process is certainly slow and difficult, and problems can 
disrupt the process. The following section raises some of the fundamental 
questions that need to be answered. 
C. SOME OBSTACLES 
Algeria and Morocco handle their social and political matters quite 
differently. The differences are apparent in the ways Islamism, ethnic minorities, 
and political openness were addressed in the past, even though the two societies 
are now gradually converging toward a common model. 
1.  Islamism 
One question is whether Islamism is an obstacle to a successful union 
between Morocco and Algeria. The answer to this question can be looked at from 
two perspectives. Islamism has some aspects that are common to both Algeria 
and Morocco, but there are also fundamental differences. In both countries, a 
“massive and rapid urbanisation of the society has played a key role in the 
Islamization process” (Stora, 2005). However, Algerian Islamists took advantage 
of the one party regime and declared themselves as the only successor to the 
National Liberation Front(NLF) after its failure to resolve social problems.  In his 
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book “The Agony of Algeria” the author Martin Stone talks about the “post-Chadli 
crisis” describing the bloody events after the army dismissed President Chadli 
Benjedid in January 1992. The “eradicateurs” in the Army prevented the 
“conciliateurs” from seeking a political solution with the main parties, including 
the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front ("But why?," 1997). 
In Morocco, on the other hand, Islamism evolved in a multiparty system 
characterising the Moroccan political landscape (Stora, 2005). This explains to a 
certain extent the different approaches used in dealing with that phenomenon.  
“While Morocco adopted an integrationist way, Algeria preferred an 
“eradicationist way towards Islamists” (Faria and Vasconcelos, 1996, p. 8). 
Extremist Islamism is more active in Algeria and is at the heart of the 
internal crisis that this country has experienced since the interrupted elections of 
1991, which were heading toward a victory of the Islamic Salvation Front.  At 
first, Morocco did not react to those incidents, but following the 1994 Marrakech 
terrorist attack that left two tourists dead and was attributed to Algerian Islamists, 
Morocco imposed a visa requirement for Algerian nationals.  Algeria reacted by 
closing the border (EIU, 2004a, p. 13). This incident shows how sensitive to 
terrorism bilateral relations can be.  On the other hand, Morocco and Algeria also 
at times cooperate to fight terrorism.  In 2000, both authorities neutralized two 
Islamist groups that were supporting each other across the border (Sonnet, 
2000).  One journalist ironically referred to that event as “The reconciliation of 
Morocco and Algeria at the expenses of Islamists.” This incident shows the 
extent to which “cooperation between the two countries can be efficient and the 
common security interest they have in fighting this intangible enemy” (Lehtnin, 
2004, p. 5).  In July 2004, Morocco removed the visa requirement for Algerian 
nationals.  
So the question whether Morocco should close its border with Algeria to 
prevent a terrorist threat is now mostly irrelevant. Terrorism has become a global 
threat. Moreover, Algeria has made significant efforts and is progressively 
succeeding to contain the internal Islamist crisis. 
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Another perspective to take into consideration is that of political Islamism, 
which is more advanced in Morocco, where the Justice and Development Party 
(PJD) for example won 42 seats in the 2002 legislative elections. Morocco is not 
a secular country; Islam is the state’s religion. Islamic parties, however, as 
other’s, have the right to express their views as long as they respect the 
democratic policies. King Mohammed VI stressed in an interview to a Moroccan 
newspaper that he “veille”(remains bold) with respect to individual liberties and 
that all political sensibilities should be allowed to have access to the political 
arena as long as they respect the democratic rules of the country ("Entretien de 
SM le Roi," 2005).The Moroccan experience with the integration of the Islamist 
democratic parties into the political landscape has been successful so far and 
can inspire the Algerian neighbor. 
2.  The Berber Minority 
In 2004, Morocco’s ministry of education and the Royal Institute of 
Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) introduced the Berber language into some 300 
primary schools throughout Morocco for the first time ("Berber teaching In 
Morocco," 2004). The Christian Science Monitor contrasts countries like 
Switzerland that comfortably mix languages in their school systems to others 
such as Algeria where Imazighen (ethnic minority) were harshly repressed 
("Berber Teaching in Morocco," 2004). The leaders of the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) had created a myth of Algerian nationalism that co-opted Islam 
and ignored the Berbers. Now those delusions are gone, stripped away by a 
demographic explosion (the country has more than thirty million people) and by 
the failure of the state to translate petroleum revenues into decent living 
standards ("Was De Gaulle Pushed," 2001). In 2001, large-scale unrest broke 
out in the region of Kabylia, and the Algerian security forces struggled to restore 
calm (EIU, 2004a, p. 9). Algeria could learn from the Moroccan experience how 




3.  Political Convergence 
The question of the heterogeneity of political systems continues to be 
raised, but differences tend to dissipate. In 1989, a new constitution was 
promulgated in Algeria to end the one-party system and allow multiparties. This 
new constitution was revised in 1996 to establish a bicameral system (EIU, 
2004a, p. 12). Morocco has had a traditional multi-party system since 
independence, and replaced the single-chamber system with a bicameral one in 
1996 (EIU, 2004b, p. 8). Algeria is opening up gradually, and its political system 
will eventually be close to its Moroccan counterpart. 
Beyond the institutional differences between the two countries, the most 
important factor of convergence is the promotion of democracy, the ability of 
citizens to express their views responsibly. Morocco is making significant efforts 
to reach sustainable human development by engaging in a process of political, 
economic, and social reforms, that aim at ensuring fair competition and 
regulating the market to avoid monopolies. The National Council of Fair 
Competition and other regulating bodies for telecommunications and the mass 
media sectors were created ("Morocco's reforms to," 2005).  Other reforms are 
being made by the creation of administrative and commercial courts, the 
reinforcement of the Supreme Auditing Court, and the protection of intellectual 
and industrial property ("Morocco's reforms to," 2005). Morocco also adopted a 
new “Moudawana,” the Personal Status Law, restricting polygamy, and giving 
women equal status and the right to initiate divorce. King Mohammed VI made 
this issue a priority when he asked, “How can society achieve progress while 
women, who represent half the nation, see their rights violated and suffer as a 
result of injustice, violence and marginalization?” (Rachidi, 2003). Islamist 
leaders say the plan is in tune with their ideas, and the PJD declared that the 
new plan “constitutes a substantial accomplishment for the entire Moroccan 
people” (Rachidi, 2003). Some voices in Algeria hail this reform and wish to have 
the same in their country, Louisa Hanoune, secretary general of the extreme left  
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Labor party said that reforms in the Moroccan family code have improved the 
situation of women and called for similar reforms in Algeria ("Two Algerian 
presidential," 2004). 
Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, during the 2004 Forum for 
the Future meeting in Morocco, highlighted the necessity for economic and 
political freedoms in the region, saying they go hand in hand: “ Now is not the 
time to argue about the pace of democratic reform or whether economic reform 
must precede political reform” ("Political and economic," 2004). Morocco has 
adopted a new labor code designed to encourage investment and job creation 
and protect workers’ rights. The code formalizes the right to trade-union 
representation and allows short-term contracts under certain conditions (EIU, 
2004a, p. 29). 
The beginning of 2004 saw the creation in Morocco of the Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission, with a mission to seek out off-court settlements of 
past human rights violations ("Amnesty International," 2005). In an interview in 
1989, King Hassan II noted that it is the evolution of Algeria toward political 
pluralism and liberalism that has allowed the building of the AMU (Ben El Hassan 
Alaoui, 1994, p.161). The harmonization of political systems will lead inevitably to 
the disappearance of symbolic borders between the two societies. 
In this part, various problems that could arise from seeking more 
integration have been discussed. These issues can certainly be overcome by the 
political will of the leadership and the commitment of the society to converge into 
this model. However, the external support is important as well to help these 
countries achieve their objectives. This next section we will try to determine the 
perspective from which the West will observe this rapprochement. 
D. THE VIEW OF THE WEST 
It is crucial to raise the question of how the great powers will see a new 
regional bloc in North Africa. The EU has considerable external trade with both 
countries, and many Algerian and Moroccan immigrants live in Europe.  Stability 
in North Africa is of great concern to European countries. An insecure Maghreb 
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represents a direct threat to Europe. France was hit in 1995 by bomb attacks 
attributed to Algerian Islamists ("Attentats de 1995," 2002). Immigration is also a 
serious matter for European countries.  A prosperous Maghreb may contribute to 
the attenuation of the wave of immigrants. “Immigration today is an increasingly 
visible and explosive issue in many European nations” (Vennkamp et al., 2003), 
and remains a sensitive one in their societies and every day life. It affects both 
the balance and the politics of Europe. Social problems, an African earthquake, 
may spread to Europe itself. There will be many refugees, especially into France 
from the still heavily French-flavored Algeria. The refugees will reignite political 
quarrels among the European Union's ten million Muslims. This will inflame right-
wing nationalists in the places where the trouble is the worst ("A Hand Grenade 
in Mid," 1994). 
Finally, a regional bloc in North Africa could help Europe adopt a common 
approach in its economic relations with these countries.  Spanish diplomacy tries 
to use the Sahara issue to its advantage by sometimes backing Morocco in its 
claim to the territories, and sometimes Algeria in its support for the separatists 
(Hormat Allah, 2004, p.119). Morocco wishes that Spain would adopt “a stand of 
dynamic and active neutrality for a rapid settlement of the Sahara issue,” as 
Taieb Fassi Fihri, a Moroccan official, has said, asking the Spanish public to take 
into account the historical facts and renounce the stereotypes and clichés about 
Morocco ("Morocco Calls Spain," 2002). However, the relations have been 
warmer since the accession of Spain’s new government, headed by Mr. Zapatero 
("Entretien de SM le Roi," 2005). The recent visit of King Juan Carlos and his 
spouse to Morocco confirms the good relations between the two kings ("Entretien 
de SM le Roi," 2005). 
The United States is also concerned about the Sahara conflict and is 
trying to find a viable solution. A stable situation in this hydrocarbons-rich region 
will facilitate access to its resources. Some analysts forecast that 25% of U.S. 
needs in hydrocarbons will come from this region in 2015 (ICG, 2005, p. 26).   
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Two-thirds of American’s direct investments in the region go to hydrocarbons 
extraction (ICG, 2005, p. 26) and there is an urgent need to secure this 
investment. 
Another source of threat is the increasing number of traffickers installed in 
this region with a direct link to terrorism financing (ICG, 2005, p. 26). Morocco 
has warned against the dangers of armed gangs in the Sahara and the perils of 
this region becoming a den to all kinds of traffickers in weapons and illegal 
immigrants’ traders ("Moroccan Official Warns," 2004). 
American Special Forces have been operating in the African nations 
bordering the Sahara desert to help them deal with Islamic terrorism. The nations 
involved include Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, 
Chad, and Niger. Their assistance is in the form of training and new equipment 
("Counter Terrorism," 2005). “The Trans-Saharan Counter-terrorism Initiative; a 
new program, will be officially kicked off in June and will be funded annually at 
US$ 100 million over five years ("Morocco part of the," 2005). 
The option proposed earlier in this thesis, the establishment of a dynamic 
economic zone between Morocco and Algeria in the Sahara region, provides a 
joint response to all these preoccupations. It will boost the region economically 
and secure it, thanks to more cooperation between the two countries. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The relationship of the partners, as in a marriage, is a key to the 
success of the arrangement. It may not be a sufficient factor itself, 
since the successful alliance needs positive quantifiable results, but 
it is certainly a necessary condition. An appropriate attitude has two 
major components, commitment and trust (Faulkner, 1992).  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The need for economic growth to ease social tensions and to promote 
prosperity for the two societies, of Morocco and Algeria, is clearly an urgent one. 
The current growth rate is not sufficient to keep up with the population growth, 
and thus, further expansion is needed. The prospects for both economies to 
become more dynamic through bilateral trade are promising, and both countries 
can gain from more integration. There are some obstacles, such as a lack of 
infrastructure and telecommunications that are hindering the expansion of trade.  
However, the predominant obstacle is political. 
Aside from the difficulties standing in the way of Maghreban integration, 
one should not forget that this process is naturally slow. The European 
community took fifty years, in spite of the firm commitment of its leadership. 
Contemporary history has divided the Maghreb, but it is time for the region to 
adopt a common political stance, build a powerful regional bloc, and be more 
competitive economically.  
Europe has had a long history of national rivalries and two world wars 
before becoming the European Union. The Middle-East and North-Africa (MENA) 
seems to be a much more “natural” economic neighborhood than other regions in 
the world (Dervis, 1997). Its countries share significant similarities, such as 
language, religion, and culture, and there is a near-unanimous agreement to 
achieve economic growth by adopting a sound macro-economic policy, changing 
the balance between the public sector and the private sector, and opening up the 
economy to foreign investment and trade. The building of an Arab economic area 
should be undertaken by focusing first on a committed core (Shafik, 1994). There 
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are considerable advantages to limiting the number of participant countries to 
those truly committed to the process; the European Union, for instance, started 
with a community of six core members, and the NAFTA began with the United 
States and Canada, then added Mexico.  
The complementarities of endowments across the region provide a basis 
for enhanced development. As Mosad Zenldin said in 1998: “In an Arab common 
market, Sudan could be the bread basket of the Arab region, the Gulf its oil 
reservoir, Egypt its labor force, Syria its farm and Morocco a great market. All 
these were and still are known facts. But what has been missing is the plan, the 
determination, and the operationalization of that plan” (Zineldin, 1998). 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS   
The success of economic integration between Morocco and Algeria can 
be a driving force for more integration in North Africa and the Middle East. The 
two countries are aware that separately, they do not possess the resources or 
know-how to cope with increasingly complex global environments. That’s why 
there is no substitute for mutual commitment to an economic and geopolitical 
integration. The two countries must review their present conditions and face the 
socio-economic and globalization challenges with an open negotiation and a 
committed cooperation.  
As shown in the Appendix, an application of Nash Arbitration or game 
theory, after a joint economic integration and the signature of free trade 
agreements with the European Union and the United States, the two countries 
can present a credible position to negotiate and/or smooth the challenges into an 
arbitration with end results of (3.5/4 , 3.25/4) with 4 being the best choice for the 
two countries, as well as for the challengers. 
For cooperation to survive, the two countries must take into account each 
other's comparative advantage and prevent lateral competition between them.  
Among the strengths of Morocco and Algeria are: strong historical, cultural, and 
religious backgrounds, and the availability of capital and a skilled workforce. 
Integration may provide numerous opportunities and benefits.  Among these are 
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a better chance to compete globally and the creation of incentives for Algerians 
and Moroccans abroad to return and invest or work in their homelands, as well 
as the improvement of social conditions through job creation.  
Morocco and Algeria cannot expect their political and economic 
differences to be resolved overnight. The pace at which political reforms will 
proceed remains an open question; therefore, the greatest responsibility of the 
leadership of Morocco and Algeria is to accept the “democratic syllogism as it 
follows:“ first, promoting economic development; then, democracy will arise from 
spontaneous generation” (Escribano, 2000). It is time for both countries to open 
their markets, even if only in a moderated, though progressive, way. This will 
lower costs for the two populations and will benefit North-African countries.  
Rejecting economic integration means not solving the current challenges 
and not improving the current conditions, insofar as the Moroccan Southern 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 45
APPENDIX. NASH ARBITRATION (GAME THEORY) 
Applied to 
Economic Integration and Free Trade Agreements 
Vs.  
Globalization and socio-economic Challenges 
(Model created by Hamid Sanhaji) 
In an increasingly complex global environment, some countries have 
undertaken a new economic integration approach. Groups are coming together 
around the world for the purpose of defending themselves economically.  
Morocco and Algeria must cooperate with each other. They must face the 
new challenges in their respective countries such as education, poverty, 
democratization, unemployment, economic growth, and environmental 
degradation, as well as the challenges of globalization: Sophisticated 
technologies, the spread of information, and economic competitiveness, mainly 
from the United States, the European community, and Far-East Asia.   
It is a unique solution to form the first cell, like planting a seed, which will 
germinate and give birth to an operational economic region, or bloc, in North-
Africa. Using game theory, we will argue that the optimal solution for Morocco 
and Algeria is economic integration, and the Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) with 
the other blocs versus the challengers.   
A.  IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM: BEFORE THE FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS (FTA’S) 
The Moroccan and Algerian economies were built under protectionism to 
encourage a domestic production. Taxes are very high, and the average income 
for the people is low. Consumers want good-quality product and free choices 
among articles in the market, but they cannot buy such products because they 
are too expensive. Thus, smugglers and traffickers respond to those demands. 
The black market and socio-economic and globalization challenges rapidly have  
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become a phenomenon that not only seriously hampers the two economies, but 
also threatens the stability and security of the two states and the entire sub-
region.  
1.    Assumptions 
As a result of the two governments’ harmonization, common policy, and 
actions taken against the black market from one part, and the solutions adopted 
to smooth the socio-economic and globalization challenges from the other part,   
the following assumptions are made to develop the matrix required to understand 
the outcomes of the conflict “game” between the two governments and the 
challengers. The two operators are assumed to behave as rational actors and 
accept the model mathematical outcomes that likely would happen: 
Note 1:  Challengers = Socio-economic problems and Globalization. 
Note 2:  Operators = Morocco and Algeria from one side as 
Governments, and Challenges from the other side as 
Challengers 
• The challenges do not pose a threat to both economies, Moroccan 
and Algerian 
• The challenges continue spreading 
• The governments of Morocco and Algeria want to end economic 
protectionism 
• Governments of Morocco and Algeria are committed to economic 
integration 
• The economic sectors of both countries demand action against the 
black Market: for example, to lower their taxes and open their 
markets to the world Economy 
• No political concessions are made between the two countries, and 
economic protectionism and high taxes on goods are maintained 
2.  The Game 
Question:  Is economic integration between Morocco and Algeria a viable 
strategic option for answering the socio-economic and globalization challenges 





a.  Governments’ Options 
On a scale of 4 to 1, with 4 being the best option and 1 being the 
worst option, this game assumes rankings for the two governments’ objectives to 
integrate their economies.  
4  Best Choice: Economic Integration is used; NO challenges 
3  Next Best Choice: Economic Integration is NOT used; NO 
challenges 
2  Next Choice: Economic Integration is Not used; Challengers are 
threatening 
1  Worst Option: NO economic Integration; Challengers are 
threatening 
Governments’ ranking of options.   
Assumption: Let us assume that the rankings as showed above, 
equal the cardinal utility: 4 is two times as good as 2, 3 is three times as good as 
1.  This assumption is necessary to conform to the Nash Arbitration. 
 
Governments’ Utility Scale 
 
b.  Challengers’ Options 
On a scale of 4 to 1, with 4 being the best option and 1 being the 
worst option, this game assumes the rankings for the challengers’ objective, 
going higher.  
4  Best Choice: Challenges go higher; Economic Integration used 
3  Next Best Choice: Challenges go higher; Economic Integration 
NOT used 
2  Next Choice: NO challenges; Economic Integration used 
1  Worst Choice: NO challenges; Economic Integration NOT used  
Challengers ranking of options.  
The same assumption as above is made to conform to the Nash 
Arbitration: 4 is two times as good as 2; 3 is three times as good as 1. 
 
 
1 2 3 4
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-Challengers’ utility scale- 
 
c.  Governments vs. Challengers 
Based on the above assumptions and rankings of desired 
outcomes, the game develops a matrix as shown below: 
 
               Challengers 
                  Threat             No threat 
  Integration not used     ( 2 , 3 )             ( 3 , 1 ) 
Governments 
               Integration  used        ( 1 , 4 )             ( 4 , 2 ) 
-Government vs. Challengers- 
 
The expected payoffs show that a Nash equilibrium exists at ( 2, 3 ). 
This is to say, Governments do not use the economic integration, and the 
challenges continue going higher.  
Note: No player can benefit by departing unilaterally from its 
strategy associated with an outcome: It is the Nash Equilibrium.  
1 2 3 4
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Governments vs. Challengers 
No operator (governments or challengers) can benefit by departing 
from its associate strategy, and governments cannot threaten or promise the 
challengers. Then it is worth analyzing each player’s game to determine if there 
is a possibility of improving an outcome by playing one side’s game. Figures 
below give the results of both the governments’ and challengers’ games.  
The objective is to show how each operator is trying to maximize its 
outcome while the opponent attempts to minimize the same operator’s outcome: 
It is the security value of each operator. 
d. Challengers’ Game 
 
               Challengers 
                  Threat             No threat 
Integration not used              3         1  
Governments 
Integration used                    4                   2  
 
Challenges’ goal:     To maximize outcome 
Governments’ goal: To minimize challenges 















( 1, 4 ) 
( 3, 1 ) 
( 4, 2 ) 
( 2, 3 ) 
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e.  Governments’ Game 
               Challengers 
                  Threat             No threat 
  Integration not used            2           3  
Governments 
               Integration used      1                     4  
 
Governments’ goal: To maximize outcome  
Challengers’ goal:    To minimize governments outcome 
Governments’ security level value: 2 
 
f.  Status Quo and Negotiation Set 
The Nash equilibrium (2, 3) is corresponding to the status-quo. As 
we will see further, the intersection of the two operators’ security levels, is very 
close to the Pareto Optimal: this is to say, there is no better or higher payoff for 
both of them together or for one of them separately.  
From this position, either the two governments or the challengers 
can improve their position. The result remains:  
• Socio-economic and globalization Challenges are going higher. 
• Governments are not using economic integration and free trade 





Status-Quo and the Negotiation Set 
 
B.  IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM: AFTER THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
(FTA’S) 
The governments of Morocco and Algeria, adopting economic integration, 
signed  free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union. 
They will open their borders to the world market and encourage foreign 
development investors to come to the region. Then the problems of the black 
market and socio-economic and globalization challenges become crucial issues 
to solve by 2012, when the GATT’s and WOT agreements must be implemented 
worldwide. 
1. Assumptions 
a.  The black market and socio-economic and globalization challenges 
are serious threats to the two countries 
b.  Challenges continue spreading and hamper their economies 
c.  The two countries want to stop protectionism 
d.  Economic sectors of both countries demand action against the 
black market: For example lower taxes and open markets to the 
world economy 
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f.  Governments are willing to engage in social discussions, new 
employment policies to create job opportunities, and insuring 
economic growth 
2.  The Game 
The same question remains: Is economic integration between Morocco 
and Algeria a viable strategic option for confronting the socio-economic and  
globalization challenges after  free trade agreements have been signed? 
a.  Governments’ Options 
On a scale of 4 to 1, with 4 being the best outcome and 1 being the 
worst, let’s assume the rankings for the governments’ objective of integrating 
their economies. 
Governments’ Options. 
4  Best Choice: Economic Integration Used; NO challenges 
3  Next Best Choice: Economic Integration is NOT used; NO 
challenges 
2  Next Choice: Economic Integration Used; Challengers are 
threatening 
1  Worst Option: Economic Integration is NOT used; Challengers are 
threatening 
Governments’ ranking of options. 
Note:  To illustrate the Nash Arbitration, the upper ordinal utility of 
the rankings equals the cardinal utility. 4 is two time as good as 2, 3 is three 
times as good as 1. 
 
-Governments Utility Scale- 
 
b.  Challengers’ Options 
On a scale of 4 to 1, with 4 being the best option and 1 being the 
worst, this game assumes the ranking for challengers’ objective of continuing 
their activities and objectives. 
 




4   Best Choice: Challenges go higher; Economic Integration used 
3   Next Best Choice: NO challenges; Economic Integration used 
2   Next Choice: Challenges go higher; Economic Integration NOT 
used 
1  Worst choice- NO challenges, and Economic integration NOT used 
 
Challengers Ranking of Options 
Note:  To illustrate the Nash Arbitration, the upper ordinal utility of 
the rankings equals the cardinal utility: 4 is two times as good as 2; 3 is three 
times as good as 1. 
 
Challengers’ utility scale 
c.  Governments vs. Challengers 
Based on the above assumptions and rankings of desired 
outcomes, a game develops with the following matrix:    
            Challengers 
                  Threat             No threat 
  Integration not used       ( 1 , 2 )    ( 3 , 1 ) 
Governments 
               Integration used ( 2 , 4 )              ( 4 , 3 ) 
 
Governments vs. Challengers  
 
From the payoffs, it can be determined that a Nash equilibrium 
exists at ( 2 , 4 ): Governments are using  Economic Integration, and challengers 
are still threatening.  
1 2 3 4
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Government vs. Challengers 
In such a situation, in which the two operators cannot benefit by 
unilaterally departing from their associate strategy, it is worth determining 
whether governments can tackle and/or smooth the challenges.  
 
      Challengers 
      Threat      No Threat 
 Integration not used   ( 1 , 2 )     ( 3 , 1 ) 
Governments       Gov. Threat     Likely threat outcome 
 Integration used   ( 2 , 4 )      ( 4 , 3 ) 
 
The upper figure gives the governments a good position to smooth 
the challenges. The governments of Morocco and Algeria will use their position of 
2 (Economic Integration), and drop it to 1, an action that forces the challengers to 
fall from 4 to 2.  
Given that action (Economy Integration), the challengers will rethink 
their game plan, choose to drop the economic hegemony and indirectly help to 
review the social problems in order to gain a higher outcome of 3, by the 
governments not dropping the economic integration. However, and to be a 
















( 4, 3 ) 
( 3, 1 ) 
( 1, 2 ) 
( 2, 4 ) 
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• Review their economic policies for better growth 
• Create job opportunities to absorb unemployment 
• Open their economies to the world market 
To determine the actual outcome of the game, it is worthwhile 
analyzing the individual player games. The following figures show the result of 
both the governments and the challengers. Each one is trying to maximize its 
outcome while the other is trying to minimize that player’s outcome: it has 
security value for each player. 
d.  Challengers’ Game 
           Challengers 
                  Threat     No threat 
  Integration not used 2                     1  
     Governments 
               Integration used    4                      3  
 
Challengers goal: To maximize outcome 
Governments goal: To minimize challengers’ outcome 
Challengers’ security value: 2 
e.  Governments’ Game 
              Challengers 
                  Threat           No threat 
  Integration not used    1       3  
Governments 
               Integration used       2       4  
Governments’ goal: To maximize outcome 
Challengers’ goal: To minimize governments’ outcome 
Governments’ Security value: 2  
f.  Status Quo and Negotiation Set 
The results of playing zero-sum games for both the governments 
and the challengers give a status quo of ( 2 , 2 ) as shown in the following figure. 
Challengers cannot do better than 2, but the governments of Morocco and 
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Algeria can improve their position from 1 – to - 2 (integration used to counter the 
socio-economic problems and become an economic bloc negotiator) by playing a 
zero sum game. The challengers will most likely view the threat position of (1, 2) 
as the status-quo and use it, rather than the security level of ( 2 , 2 ), as the 
position from which to conduct Nash Arbitration.  
 
 
g.  Nash Arbitration 
The line intersecting the points ( 2 , 4 ) and ( 4 , 3 ) is the Pareto 
Optimal line, illustrating the negotiation set. This is to say that there is the 
possibility of an outcome which gives both operators better payoffs, or would give 
one operator a better payoff. From this point, either the governments and/or the 
challengers can do better.  
Arbitration from the status quo ( 1 , 2 ) allows the two operators to 
maximize their utility gains as shown in the following figure: 
Using the geometric method, we can calculate the Nash arbitration 
position: NPA. 
The extension of the Pareto Optimal line intersects with the 
challengers’ security level at the value of ( 6 ,  2)  =  P2, and with the 
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From these two positions, P1 and P2, we have the following: 
 
 
By presenting a credible strategy, the governments force the 
challengers into an arbitration with end results of (3.5 , 3.25). The challengers 
abandon the high position of threatening, accepting a lower outcome than the 
Nash equilibrium. The governments, however, must give something to the 
challengers: 
• Create opportunity jobs to absorb unemployment 
• Abandon economic protectionism and initiate the structural 
adjustments to allow economic growth, and adhere to the GATT 
and WOT regulations 
• Open their economies to the world market 
































C.  SUMMARY 
Using game theory to explain the use of economic integration was not 
positive before the governments signed free trade agreements with the European 
Union, or other economic blocs for two reasons: 
• The two governments used economic barriers (protectionism) and 
maintained high taxes on imports and law enforcement on the black 
market, without paying attention to the socio economic problems 
and populations. 
• The challenges were going higher before the negotiations because: 
• The stakes were very important for both sides,  
• The operators were not rational, and 
• The FTA’s were not implemented by the two countries. 
After the Government of Morocco and Algeria signed free trade 
















Governments’ Security Level 
Challengers’ Security Level 
Negotiation Set 
Nash Arbitration Point 
















and opening their economies to the international market, and also promising a 
good socio-economic policy with the creation of job opportunities, then the 
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